TEAR: Temporal-aware Automated Red-teaming for Text-to-Video Models

Jiaming He[1], Guanyu Hou[2], Hongwei Li[1], Zhicong Huang[3†], Kangjie Chen[4],
Yi Yu[5†], Wenbo Jiang[1†], Guowen Xu[1] and Tianwei Zhang[4]
[1]University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, [2]University of Manchester
[3]Ant Group, [4]Nanyang Technological University, [5]Jilin University

Abstract

*Text-to-Video (T2V) models are capable of synthesizing high-quality, temporally coherent dynamic video content, but the diverse generation also inherently introduces critical safety challenges. Existing safety evaluation methods, which focus on static image and text generation, are insufficient to capture the complex temporal dynamics in video generation. To address this, we propose a **TE**mporal-aware **A**utomated **R**ed-teaming framework, named **TEAR**, an automated framework designed to uncover safety risks specifically linked to the dynamic temporal sequencing of T2V models. TEAR employs a temporal-aware test generator optimized via a two-stage approach: initial generator training and temporal-aware online preference learning, to craft textually innocuous prompts that exploit temporal dynamics to elicit policy-violating video output. And a refine model is adopted to improve the prompt stealthiness and adversarial effectiveness cyclically. Extensive experimental evaluation demonstrates the effectiveness of TEAR across open-source and commercial T2V systems with an over 80% attack success rate, a significant boost from the prior best result of 57%.*

***Warning**: This paper contains model outputs which are offensive in nature.*

1. Introduction

The rise of diffusion models has revolutionized the field of Text-to-Video (T2V) generation [6, 19, 32, 44, 47], with models like Veo [2], Hailuo [3], and Wan [37] now leading the change in synthesizing high-quality, temporally coherent videos from textual descriptions. However, due to the advanced ability of T2V models to generate diverse content, these models can also be triggered to produce harmful video content, either intentionally or unintentionally [27, 30]. Consequently, ensuring the safety of video content generated by these models has become crucial in T2V model development.



Figure 1. Textually safe prompts can generate temporally harmful videos, which is shown below the video frames.

To ensure the generated content is aligned with human values, the T2V developers can thoroughly identify and evaluate the potential safety vulnerabilities of T2V models and implement alignment mechanisms using the collected problematic cases.

Red-teaming has emerged as a promising methodology for systematically identifying safety vulnerabilities in generative models by simulating adversarial scenarios. Red-teaming for Large Language Models (LLMs) [15, 45, 46] focuses on using adversarial textual prompts to generate harmful outputs. For Vision-Language Models (VLMs), Chen et al. [9] are the first to investigate adversarial multimodal test cases to assess robustness. Image generation model approaches [21, 26] use optimization-based mechanisms or adversarial probing to generate prompts that lead to unsafe outputs.

However, unlike red-teaming in previous generative models, it is essential to incorporate temporal-aware knowledge in the red-teaming of T2V models. For instance, as illustrated in Figure 1, an attacker can craft a problematic prompt as a sequence of individually benign prompts whose concatenation produces an unsafe video (a temporal-aggregation attack). Existing red-teaming approaches [9, 15, 21, 26, 45, 46] could be adapted to only handle a video as a sequence of independent frames, but lack mecha-

†Corresponding Author

nisms for assessing the safety risks that emerge from temporal dynamics, thus systematically under-performing on red-teaming of T2V models. Incorporating temporal information into T2V red-teaming substantially enlarges the search space, introducing a new technical challenge.

To address this challenge, we propose **TE**mporal-aware **A**utomated **R**ed-teaming (TEAR), an automated framework design to systematically uncover these temporal vulnerabilities. To thoroughly learn the T2V vulnerable distribution enlarged by temporal dynamics, our approach formulates red-teaming prompt generation as a multi-stage optimization process on prompt and temporal dimension. To automatically generate the problematic prompts, TEAR first models a temporal-aware space by training the test generator on a pre-trained large language model (LLM) with continuous natural language distribution. This generator is then progressively optimized through temporal-aware online preference learning, incorporating feedback signals from designed prompt-level reward and temporal consistency reward to steer the LLM's continuous distribution towards a target temporal-aware prompt distribution. To further enhance the effectiveness of the problematic prompts, TEAR iteratively refines the prompts with a refine model until the red-teaming objective is reached.

We conducted extensive experiments on two latest open-source models (Wan2.2 and Hunyuan-Video) and three commercial models (Veo-3.1, Hailuo-2.3, and Ray 2), as well as three safety filters, and compared TEAR with four state-of-the-art (SOTA) baselines across six unsafe categories. Experimental results demonstrate that TEAR achieves an over 80% success rate across four popular T2V models , consistently outperforming all baselines whose best result is about 57%. Moreover, evaluations show that the problematic prompts exhibit strong transferability across unknown T2V models. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:

- We propose TEAR, an automated red-teaming framework that systematically uncovers temporal vulnerabilities in T2V models, identifying latent safety risks that emerge from dynamic event sequencing.
- We conduct comprehensive evaluations on five leading T2V models and against four SOTA baselines, demonstrating the superior performance of TEAR over existing red-teaming approaches.
- We expose the critical safety failures in current commercial T2V API-services, demonstrating that the safety filters are insufficient for dynamically unsafe cases.

2. Related-work

Text-to-Video Generation. Text-to-video (T2V) generation aims to synthesize high-quality, temporally coherent videos that are semantically aligned with given textual descriptions. Early approaches were predominantly based on Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [22, 29, 35] and autoregressive models [18, 42]. The field has since seen a paradigm shift to diffusion models, which are now the dominant methodology [6, 10, 14, 19, 25, 32, 38, 40, 44, 47]. Prominent strategies include extending pre-trained text-to-image (T2I) models with new temporal modules [14] or jointly fine-tuning spatial and temporal components, exemplified by LaVie [40], which often employs a cascaded framework [38, 40]. More recently, integrating transformer-based backbones has led to significant breakthroughs in video quality, realism, and length [10, 19, 25, 32, 44, 47].

Red-teaming for Generative Models. Red teaming is a structured methodology to identify failure modes and improve model robustness [7, 13, 20, 31, 39]. Early efforts used manual prompt curation, which is costly and unscalable, so recent work shifted to automated red teaming [11, 20, 33]. Automated LLM methods include prompt-level optimization or training attacker models, but they often struggle to balance attack success and diversity [15, 31, 34, 39]. Red teaming for VLMs is a nascent field [9]. Single-modality techniques are insufficient due to complex interdependencies, highlighting the need for tailored, multi-modal frameworks [9]. Similarly, Text-to-image automated red-teaming strategies include token-level perturbations and semantic transformations [8, 21, 24, 26, 41, 43]. However, these are often limited by poor prompt readability or inefficient feedback mechanisms. And Miao et al. [27] carry out the first benchmark on evaluating the safety of T2V generation.

In this paper, we firstly explore the red-teaming study on the T2V generation and propose an automated red-teaming framework for T2V Models with dynamic temporal-based optimization.

3. Methodology

3.1. Problem Formulation

3.1.1. Formulation of Text-to-Video Red-teaming

The objective of red teaming for Text-to-Video (T2V) models is to systematically identify safe textual prompts that cause the model to generate unsafe video content, thereby evaluating and improving its safety. Formally, we consider a T2V model $\mathcal{M}(.)$ that maps a prompt p to a respective video v. The goal of the automated red teaming system $\mathcal{R}$ is to discover a set of adversarial prompts $\mathcal{P}_v^*$, which is defined as:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P}_v^* = \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{P}_v^u, T, \mathcal{M}, \Phi_P, \Phi_V) \\ \text{s.t. } p \in \mathcal{P}_v^* \mid \mathbf{\Phi}_P(p) = 0 \wedge \mathbf{\Phi}_V(\mathcal{M}(p)) = 1 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

Here, $\mathcal{R}$ is the red teaming system operating with a red-teaming target T (e.g., a target harmful category) and an

initial set of unsafe seed prompts $\mathcal{P}_v^u$. The successful condition of red-teaming tests states that for any prompt p in the discovered set $\mathcal{P}_v^*$, it must be identified as "safe" by textual judgment system $\mathbf{\Phi}_P$, while the corresponding generated video $v = \mathcal{M}(p)$ is identified as "unsafe" by video judgment system $\mathbf{\Phi}_V$.

Finding the complete set $\mathcal{P}^*$ is computationally intensive due to the discrete prompt space and the high cost of video generation. Therefore, the practical goal of automated red teaming on T2V models is not exhaustive discovery. The goal is rather to conduct a temporal-aware search in continuous space, with a particular emphasis on uncovering vulnerabilities unique to the temporal domain.

3.1.2. Threat Model

Our threat model is defined from the perspective of a T2V model developer who seeks to proactively audit their own T2V models for safety vulnerabilities prior to their public release. The developer is also equipped with auxiliary models, such as large language models and large vision-language models, which serve as automated evaluators to assess the safety of both prompts and the generated video content. The primary objective is to uncover vulnerabilities unique to the temporal dimension of video, where a semantically innocuous prompt can trigger the generation of policy-violating actions/sequences as the video unfolds. This threat model is justified as it aligns with the auditing process of a T2V model developer, whose primary goal is to enhance the reliability of the model before deployment.

3.2. Overview of TEAR

We introduce **TE**mporal-aware **A**utomated **R**ed-teaming (TEAR), an automated framework to systematically uncover safety vulnerabilities in T2V models. As illustrated in Figure 2, TEAR operates with three components: a *temporal-aware test generator*, a *refine model*, and a *target T2V model*. The core component is the temporal-aware test generator, which is trained to create textually safe prompts that exploit temporal dynamics to elicit unsafe video content. The generator receives an initial seed prompt and a red-teaming objective to generate initialized problematic prompts. A refine model then receives evaluations from judgment systems and iteratively to revise the initialized prompts, progressively aligning them with the red-teaming objective.

3.3. Temporal-aware Test Generator Optimization

We formulate T2V red-teaming as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) defined by the tuple $\langle \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}, P, R, \rangle$. Here, $\mathcal{S}$ is the state space (generated token sequence), $\mathcal{A}$ is the action space (next token selection for problematic prompt generation), P is the state-transition probability, R is the reward function. Our optimization is a two-stage approach. First, a generator $G_{initial}$ is fine-tuned on a curated dataset to ensure operation within a coherent state space $\mathcal{S}$. Subsequently, G_{final} is initialized from $G_{initial}$ and refined through temporal-aware online preference learning by interacting with the target T2V model. Within the MDP, the generator $G_{final} \sim \pi(a_t|s_t)$ selects an action a_t given state s_t. The reward function $\mathbf{R}_{con}$ focuses on video-centric dimensions and video-language alignment. This online reinforcement learning setup transforms the discrete prompt optimization problem into a continuous optimization with the learned distribution.

3.3.1. Initial Generator Training

In the first and second stage of generator optimization, we initialize the test generator with well-constructed red-teaming datasets comprising initial unsafe generation prompts and carefully crafted problematic prompts to align with the pre-defined red-teaming objective.

Rule-based Dataset Construction. We first constructed a meta harmful dataset $\mathbf{D}_m$ and used its unsafe seed prompts to create a question answering conversational dataset $\mathbf{D}_p$ to train our red-teaming test generator. Subsequently, we apply our temporal-aware rewriting. We query the LLM with p_s using a time-ordered instruction sequence to transform the textual semantics into a safe form while preserving the unsafe video-level semantics. This follows three rewriting rules: ① **Temporal Deconstruction:** The LLM decomposes the harmful directive into a chronological sequence of discrete static event descriptions. ② **Sequential Enforcement:** The LLM inserts explicit temporal connectives (e.g., "First," "After two seconds") to enforce a strict chronological progression. ③ **Temporal-Space Synthesis:** Harmfulness is not inherent to any individual description but emerges exclusively from the temporal composition of these events, reconstructing the unsafe action.

The resulting dataset $\mathbf{D}_p$ is structured for optimization as a set of tuples $\mathbf{D}_p = \{<p_s^1, p_t^1>, \ldots, <p_s^n, p_t^n>\}$, which includes initial seed prompt p_s and the rewritten problematic prompt p_t. Then, we conduct a data selection on the core red-teaming objective: the problematic prompt must be judged as "safe" by the textual judgment system ($\Phi_P(p) = 0$), yet the corresponding generated video $v = \mathcal{M}(p)$ must be identified as "unsafe" by the video judgment system ($\Phi_V(v) = 1$).

Initial Generator Training. To initialize the generator in the second stage, we conduct initial training on the base LLM with the carefully constructed dataset $\mathbf{D}_p$ and defined instruction I, adopting auto-regressive style negative log-likelihood loss on the next token:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{Ini}} = -\mathbb{E}_{(p_s,p_t,T)\sim\mathbf{D}_p} \log p(p_t|p_s, I) \tag{2}$$



Figure 2. **Overview of the TEAR framework.** Our approach has two phases. (a) **Test-case Generator Optimization**: A generator is trained in three stages (Dataset Construction, Initial Training, Temporal-aware Optimization) using rule-based construction and temporal-aware rewards (R_{pmt}, R_{con}) maximization. (b) **Red-teaming Test Case Generation**: The optimized generator produces a prompt (P_t) that aims to be judged as safe by the **Prompt Judge System** ($\Phi_P(p) = 0$) but produce an unsafe video, as caught by the **Video Judge System** ($\Phi_V(\mathcal{M}(p)) = 1$). A **Refine Model** uses this feedback to populate the final red-teaming set (D_R).

In this way, the initialized generator $G_{initial}$ has learned the rough distribution of the dataset $\mathbf{D}_p$ and is proficient in generating the initial problematic prompts.

3.3.2. Temporal-aware Online Preference Learning

In the third stage, we progressively align the initialized generator $G_{initial}$ by incorporating feedback signals from two primary dimensions, which are derived by decomposing the red-teaming objective: the prompt space and temporal space to ensure the textual safety and temporal consistency of harmful video generation.

Prompt Space Optimization. We define a prompt-level reward function, $\mathbf{R}_{pmt}(.)$, to optimize for two complementary goals: safety and pattern alignment. It is a weighted combination computed for an optimized prompt p_t:

$$\mathbf{R}_{pmt}(p_t) = \mathbb{E}_{p_t \sim G_\delta(p_s)} \left[\alpha_1 \cdot (1 - \mathbf{g}_t(p_t)) + \alpha_2 \cdot \frac{(\mathbf{g}_r(p_t) + 1)}{2}\right] \quad (3)$$

Here, $\mathbf{g}_t(\cdot)$ is a confidence function of pre-trained hate speech classifier [36]. The reward term $\mathbf{g}_r(\cdot)$ is introduced to guide the generated p_t to align with the overall structural patterns of our pre-constructed, rule-based samples.

To achieve this, we select a subset of representative temporal-style samples $\mathcal{P}_{ref}$, and their average embedding acts as a prototype representing the target temporal pattern. The $\mathbf{g}_r(p_t)$ score is formally defined as the cosine similarity between p_t and this prototype:

$$\mathbf{g}_r(p_t) = \frac{\left\langle \mathcal{T}_p(p_t), \frac{1}{|\mathcal{P}_{ref}|} \sum_{p' \in \mathcal{P}_{ref}} \mathcal{T}_p(p') \right\rangle}{\|\mathcal{T}_p(p_t)\| \cdot \left\| \frac{1}{|\mathcal{P}_{ref}|} \sum_{p' \in \mathcal{P}_{ref}} \mathcal{T}_p(p') \right\|} \quad (4)$$

where the $\mathcal{T}_p(.)$ denotes a pre-trained sentence encoder for extracting the sentence embedding of the input prompts.

Temporal Space Consistency. Nevertheless, only optimizing in prompt space is hard to directly ensure the video generation is well aligned with the meta harmful semantics. Therefore, we formulate a approach in temporal space to optimize with the generated videos during online learning. For each training step, a problematic prompt p_t is sampled from the policy model G_δ by being fed with a seed prompt p_s, and a video $v'_p = \mathcal{M}_l(p_t)$ can obtained by querying the oracle T2V model. Specifically, the generated video v'_p is decomposed into a set of continuous frames at a specific sampling rate: $\mathcal{F}_{v'_p} = \{f_1 \dots f_i\}$ and the video encoder $\mathcal{E}_v(.)$ extracts the continuous video features to create a sequence of temporally-ordered latent tokens. Then, we de-

fine the consistency reward function $\mathbf{R}_{con}(.)$ as:

$$\mathbf{R}_{con}(p_s, p_t) = \mathbb{E}_{v'_p \sim \mathcal{M}(p_t)} \min(\beta, (\frac{\mathbf{g}_{gc}(p_s, \mathcal{E}_v(\mathcal{F}_{v'_p})) - \gamma_1}{\theta_1} + \frac{\mathbf{g}_{ic}(\mathcal{E}_v(\mathcal{F}_{v'_p}) - \gamma_2}{\theta_2}) \tag{5}$$

where $\mathbf{g}_{gc}(.)$ and $\mathbf{g}_{ic}(.)$ denote the global-consistency and inner-consistency scoring models, respectively. $\mathbf{g}_{gc}(.)$ computes the global video-text temporal consistency between the meta harmful semantics of p_s and the generated video v'_p, while $\mathbf{g}_{ic}(.)$ computes the inner temporal consistency of v'_p to ensure video generation utility. These consistency models are equipped with pre-trained weight [23], trained on large-scale preference video data, endowing strong generalization capabilities in the temporal domain and making them robust judges of semantic alignment.

Online Preference Learning. Then, we define the training objective by applying the defined rewards and adopt PPO paradigm to maximize the expected objective over the training set $\mathbf{D}_p$. We can optimize the policy model G_δ to obtain the final red-teaming test generator G_{final} by maximizing the designed rewards above for two different tasks:

$$\zeta = \mathbf{E}_{p_s \sim \mathbf{D_m},\ p_t \sim G_\delta(x)}[\mathbf{R}_{pmt}(p_t) + \mathbf{R}_{con}(p_s, p_t) - \lambda \log \frac{G_\delta(p_t|p_s)}{G_{initial}(p_t|p_s)}] \tag{6}$$

To mitigate over-optimization [28], an additional Kullback-Leibler penalty is added as regulation constraint between the policy model G_δ and the initial generator $G_{initial}$ with a coefficient λ.

3.4. Test Case Refinement

While the temporal-aware test generator provides a fundamental initialization for the initial problematic prompt p_t^i, a refinement stage is crucial for iteratively enhancing its usability and stealthiness. This stage operates as a collaborative feedback loop guided by a refine model $\mathcal{R}_m$, implemented as a Multi-modal Large Language Model (MLLM) that enabled with few-shot in-context learning. After the target model generates the corresponding video $\mathcal{M}(p_t)$ from the initialized prompt p_t^i, the case is evaluated by a textual judgment system $\mathbf{\Phi}_P$ to assess the safety of the generated problematic prompt, while a video judgment system $\mathbf{\Phi}_V$ assesses the harmfulness of the video. The refine model $\mathcal{R}_m$ then receives the problematic prompt p_t, the respective generated video $\mathcal{M}(p_t)$, and the feedback from both $\mathbf{\Phi}_P$ and $\mathbf{\Phi}_V$. By its video understanding capability, $\mathcal{R}_m$ analyzes the structured feedback on prompt and generated video, including a quantitative score, a qualitative explanation, and an actionable suggestion. This feedback directs the refine model $\mathcal{R}_m$ to revise the initialized prompt into an updated version p_{t+1}, forming a closed loop that progressively uncovers more subtle and complex vulnerabilities.

4. Experiments

4.1. Experimental Setup

Models. Our evaluation targets diverse T2V models, including open-source models Wan 2.2-14B [37] and Hunyuan-Video [19]. We also assess commercial services Google Veo-3.1 [2], MiniMax Hailuo-2.3 [3], and Luma Ray-2 [1]. For video generation, we utilized default video lengths (typically 5–8 seconds) and specific resolutions: 1360×768 for Hailuo-2.3, 1024×704 for Wan 2.2, and 1280×720 for Veo-3.1, Luma Ray-2 and Hunyuan-Video. The temporal-aware test generator is built on Llama-3 [12] fine-tuned with LoRA [16], while the refine model is based on Qwen-3-VL [5] using few-shot in-context learning. The training parameter of the generator involves 4,000 training steps (batch 8, peak LR 1.0×10^{-5}) followed by online RL training (AdamW, LR 1.0×10^{-6}, $\gamma = 1.0$, and $\lambda = 0.95$), both using a cosine scheduler. Generation adopts beam search with $b = 16$ and a 100-token limit.

Harmful Categories and Datasets. We define the red-teaming objective using six harmful categories: `Violence`, `Gore`, `Self-harm`, `Pornography`, `Illegal Activity`, and `Disturbing Content`. These categories encompass critical scenarios where T2V models may generate unsafe outputs. For the seed prompt dataset, we collected the 390 meta-harmful prompts from T2VSafetyBenchmark [27] and additional categories, 65 prompts per unsafe category.

Baseline methods. We compare our framework with the state-of-the-art (SOTA) automated red-teaming methods on T2I generation: ART [21] and FLIRT [26], which we carefully adapt to the T2V generation setting for a fair comparison. And we also include two unsafe video generation strategies: the UVD [30] and T2VSafetyBenchmark [27]. The implementation details of the baseline methods can be found in the Appendix.

Evaluation Setting. We adopt oracle judgment systems to evaluate prompt and video harmfulness. The textual judgment system $\mathbf{\Phi}_P$ comprises a Toxicity Detector (TD) [36], an NSFW detector [4], and the Meta-Llama-Guard-3-8B [12] guard model. For the video judgment system $\mathbf{\Phi}_V$, we follow T2VSafetyBench [27] and use the GPT-4o API with detailed criteria. Our primary metric is the Attack Success Rate (ASR), where an attack is successful if $\mathbf{\Phi}_V$ classifies the generated video as harmful. Conversely, an attempt is an Attack Failure if the T2V model's inherent

Table 1. Success cases and prompt pass rate on 390 meta harmful seed prompts

Model	Method	Success Cases by Category						Success Cases	Prompt Successful Pass (PSR) ↑		
		Violence	Gore	Self-harm	Porn.	Illegal Act.	Disturb. Content	(ASR)↑	TD	NSFW	LLAMA GUARD
Hunyuan-Video	Naive	0	1	2	0	4	3	10 (2.6%)	98.3%	98.9%	99.4%
	T2VSafetyBench	37	30	24	18	21	29	159 (40.8%)	51.0%	53.0%	54.0%
	UVD	25	21	20	8	17	22	113 (29.0%)	90.8%	90.2%	91.1%
	FLIRT	47	44	37	21	36	38	223 (57.2%)	51.4%	52.2%	51.9%
	ART	43	41	32	19	34	36	205 (52.6%)	92.2%	93.0%	92.7%
	TEAR	61	55	58	29	57	61	**321 (82.3%)**	96.7%	96.5%	95.6%
Wan 2.2	Naive	2	1	1	0	3	2	9 (2.3%)	98.6%	97.2%	98.3%
	T2VSafetyBench	35	29	23	11	22	25	145 (37.2%)	50.8%	53.5%	53.7%
	UVD	27	23	19	10	20	22	121 (31.0%)	89.0%	90.0%	90.8%
	FLIRT	45	44	39	20	36	36	220 (56.4%)	48.6%	50.8%	50.5%
	ART	42	39	33	17	30	33	194 (49.7%)	91.8%	92.4%	93.2%
	TEAR	57	63	56	27	53	58	**314 (80.5%)**	94.3%	97.4%	94.9%



Figure 3. The effectiveness of TEAR on commercial T2V services.

filter blocks it. A prompt is non-compliant if it triggers any alarm within $\mathbf{\Phi}_P$.

4.2. Main Results

Comparison with Baseline Methods. As shown in Table 1, TEAR demonstrates significantly higher red-teaming effectiveness than baselines on open-source T2V models. On Hunyuan-Video, TEAR achieves an 82.3% ASR, substantially outperforming FLIRT (57.2% ASR). A similar trend is seen on Wan 2.2, where 80.5% ASR of TEAR markedly surpasses FLIRT (56.4%). The Naive approach (normal video generation prompts) is ineffective, with ASRs around 2.3%-2.6%. This ASR gap illustrates the limitations of existing T2V red-teaming, as baselines adapted from static image generation are not optimized for temporal dynamics. This component is optimized to craft textually innocuous prompts by deconstructing and recomposing harmful semantics across a temporal sequence, successfully bypassing prompt-level filters to elicit policy-violating video. In addition to remaining highly effective when starting from purely safe seed prompts, as detailed in the Appendix, we also perform ablation studies on TEAR to examine the effects of different parameters.

Effectiveness on commercial T2V Services. As detailed in Figure 3, TEAR demonstrates high effectiveness on commercial T2V services. The prompts achieve near-perfect API-level and NSFW Filter Pass Rates, approaching 98.0%, yet yield high ASRs, generally at or above 85.0% for most categories like `Violence`. The `Pornography` category registers the lowest ASR, falling below 80.0%. We observe a slightly lower ASR on Ray-2, which we hypothesize is due to lower video-prompt consistency, a characteristic also demonstrated by VBench [17]. This discrepancy between high filter pass rates and high ASRs exposes a significant safety alignment failure in commercial T2V services.

Seed-free Generation. We evaluate the performance of TEAR in a seed-free setting in Table 2. TEAR achieves a 79.2% ASR on Hunyuan-Video and 76.9% on Wan 2.2,

Table 2. Success cases and prompt pass rate on **Seed-free** generation

Model	Method	Success Cases by Category						Success Cases	Prompt Successful Pass (PSR)		
		Violence	Gore	Self-harm	Porn.	Illegal Act.	Disturb. Content	(ASR)↑	TD	NSFW	LLAMA GUARD
Hunyuan-Video	FLIRT	46	42	37	19	34	37	215 (55.1%)	51.3%	52.4%	51.6%
	ART	44	40	30	20	32	37	203 (52.1%)	91.6%	92.7%	92.5%
	TEAR	60	51	55	26	52	65	**309 (79.2%)**	95.7%	96.2%	94.6%
Wan 2.2	FLIRT	45	43	36	16	35	35	210 (53.8%)	50.5%	50.8%	49.2%
	ART	40	37	30	14	29	31	181 (46.4%)	90.54%	91.1%	92.4%
	TEAR	62	53	56	23	49	57	**300 (76.9%)**	93.8%	97.0%	94.3%

substantially outperforming FLIRT (55.1% and 53.8% respectively). TEAR also maintains high textual safety, with NSFW pass rates of 96.2% (Hunyuan-Video) and 97.0% (Wan 2.2). These results demonstrate the effectiveness of TEAR in autonomous prompt generation. With high ASRs comparable to seed-based evaluations, TEAR demonstrates its ability to independently discover temporal vulnerabilities, underscoring its flexibility and scalability.



(a) Attack Success Rate (b) NSFW Filter Pass Rate

Figure 4. The impact of refining rounds on ASR and NSFW Filter Pass Rate.

Impact of Refining Rounds. We evaluate the impact of iterative refinement in Figure 4. Both the ASR and the NSFW Filter Pass Rate increase across all models with more refining rounds. Figure 4(a) shows that the ASR begins at 57%-71% in the direct setting, rises sharply in the first three rounds, and then the growth rate moderates, reaching 83%-95% after 8 rounds. Similarly, Figure 4(b) shows the NSFW Filter Pass Rate starts high at 79%-86% and steadily increases, with its growth also slowing as it surpasses 95%. This simultaneous improvement demonstrates the efficacy of the refinement stage, suggesting the iterative process successfully optimizes for the dual objectives of red-teaming tests. The closed-loop mechanism, where the refine model uses feedback to revise prompts, appears efficient in the initial rounds at correcting evident prompt failures.

Impacts of Generation Settings. As shown in Figure 6, the impact of generation parameters varies. Specifically, ASR shows a significant increase as inference steps rise,



Figure 5. Diversity of prompts generated by TEAR for different categories.

eventually reaching a plateau around 50 steps, after which it stabilizes with minimal variation. Additionally, ASR varies distinctively with the CFG scale, peaking at moderate value. This behavior suggests that video quality, which correlates with these parameters, significantly impacts the Φ_V assessment. Optimal generation settings provide Φ_V with clearer visual information, enhancing the Refine Model's ability to optimize for effectiveness.

Prompt Diversity. As shown in Figure 5, we assess prompt diversity using 1-AvgSelfBLEU and 1-Cossim, metrics that measure semantic dissimilarity, where higher values indicate greater diversity. The results across the six harmful categories are presented in Figure 5. We observe that the prompts maintain a high level of diversity across all categories. The 1-AvgSelfBLEU scores are consistently high, ranging from approximately 0.71 (Self-harm) to 0.76 (Illegal Activity). The 1-Cossim scores show a similar trend, remaining stable between 0.69 (Disturbing Content) and 0.73 (Pornography). This ensures that the system is effective at red-teaming because it successfully explores a broad and varied semantic space to produce a wide range of textually distinct problematic prompts.



(a) Step vs. Scale (ASR) (b) Step vs. Scale (PSR) (c) Number of Frames vs. Scale (ASR) (d) Number of Frames vs. Scale (PSR)

Figure 6. Impact of generation settings (Step, Scale, and Number of Frames on attack effectiveness and safe prompt generation.



Figure 7. Case studies on the transferability of optimized problematic prompt.

Table 3. Transferability of the ASR (%) across T2V models.

From ↓ \ To →	Wan	Hunyuan	Veo	Hailuo	Ray
Wan 2.2	-	75.4%	80.8%	81.0%	74.3%
Hunyuan-Video	75.9%	-	81.1%	76.4%	72.6%
Veo-3.1	75.4%	76.0%	-	77.2%	68.5%
Hailuo-2.3	73.6%	80.9%	75.3%	-	75.9%
Ray-2	71.7%	75.1%	78.6%	82.6%	-

4.3. Analysis of Test Transferability

Transferability of Problematic Prompts. We analyze the transferability of problematic prompts across five T2V models in Table 3. The results demonstrate remarkably high ASRs across all source-target pairs, indicating strong and consistent cross-model effectiveness. The average transfer ASR across all 20 source-target combinations is a high 76.4%. The performance is consistently strong, with most transfer ASRs clustering tightly between 70% and 82%. For instance, prompts optimized for Wan 2.2 achieve an 80.8% ASR on Veo-3.1, while prompts generated from Ray-2 show the peak transferability, achieving 82.6% ASR on Hailuo-2.3. The shown transferability (majority >70% ASR) on black-box models strongly indicates a shared, fundamental weakness of T2V safety.

Case Study. Figure 7 shows a case study demonstrating the transferability of optimized problematic prompts. For harmful concepts like "*A murderer tried to strangle the victim*" and "*A murderer kills a person by stabbing*," TEAR generates textually safe prompts. Even though these prompts were not optimized on all models, they effectively trigger harmful video synthesis (e.g., stabbing) across a diverse set of T2V models (Veo-3.1, Hailuo-2.3, and Hunyuan-Video). This successful transfer of optimized prompts confirms that TEAR identifies a common temporal vulnerability shared by different models.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, we propose TEAR, the first automated framework to systematically uncover temporal vulnerabilities in T2V models. We address a critical gap, as existing red-teaming methods for static images or text are insufficient for risks emerging from temporal dynamics. Extensive evaluation demonstrates TEAR's high effectiveness and transferability across a range of commercial and open-source T2V models. TEAR provides a scalable tool for developers to proactively audit T2V systems, enabling the discovery of complex temporal flaws and contributing to the development of safety aligned generative models.

Acknowledgment

This work is supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 62502075 and 62402087 and in part by the General Program of the Sichuan Provincial Natural Science Foundation under Grant 2026NSFSC0431 and 2025ZNSFSC1490, the Fundamental Research Funds for Chinese Central Universities under Grant ZYGX2024J019, the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation under Grant BX20230060 and 2024M760356.

References

[1] Luma-ray2-text-to-video-generation-model. https://lumalabs.ai/ray. 5

[2] Google-veo3-text-to-video-generation-model. https://aistudio.google.com/models/veo-3. 1, 5

[3] Minimax-hailuo2.3-text-to-video-generation-model. https://www.minimaxi.com/news/minimax-hailuo-23. 1, 5

[4] Not-safe-for-work-text. https://huggingface.co/TostAI/nsfw-text-detection-large. 5

[5] Shuai Bai, Yuxuan Cai, Ruizhe Chen, Keqin Chen, Xionghui Chen, Zesen Cheng, Lianghao Deng, Wei Ding, Chang Gao, Chunjiang Ge, et al. Qwen3-vl technical report. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2511.21631*, 2025. 5

[6] Andreas Blattmann, Tim Dockhorn, Sumith Kulal, Daniel Mendelevitch, Maciej Kilian, Dominik Lorenz, Yam Levi, Zion English, Vikram Voleti, Adam Letts, et al. Stable video diffusion: Scaling latent video diffusion models to large datasets. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.15127*, 2023. 1, 2

[7] Miles Brundage, Shahar Avin, Jasmine Wang, Haydn Belfield, Gretchen Krueger, Gillian Hadfield, Heidy Khlaaf, Jingying Yang, Helen Toner, Ruth Fong, et al. Toward trustworthy ai development: mechanisms for supporting verifiable claims. In *arXiv preprint arXiv:2004.07213*, 2020. 2

[8] Yichuan Cao, Yibo Miao, Xiao-Shan Gao, and Yinpeng Dong. Red-teaming text-to-image systems by rule-based preference modeling. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.21074*, 2025. 2

[9] Kangjie Chen, Muyang Li, Guanlin Li, Shudong Zhang, Shangwei Guo, and Tianwei Zhang. TRUST-VLM: Thorough red-teaming for uncovering safety threats in vision-language models. In *Proceedings of the 42nd International Conference on Machine Learning*, 2025. 1, 2

[10] Shoufa Chen, Chongjian Ge, Yuqi Zhang, Yida Zhang, Fengda Zhu, Hao Yang, Hongxiang Hao, Hui Wu, Zhichao Lai, Yifei Hu, et al. Goku: Flow based video generative foundation models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.04896*, 2025. 2

[11] Emily Dinan, Samuel Humeau, Braden Chintagunta, and Jason Weston. Build it break it fix it for dialogue safety: Robustness from adversarial human attack. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.06083*, 2019. 2

[12] Abhimanyu Dubey, Abhinav Jauhri, Abhinav Pandey, Abhishek Kadian, Ahmad Al-Dahle, Aiesha Letman, Akhil Mathur, Alan Schelten, Amy Yang, Angela Fan, et al. The llama 3 herd of models. *arXiv e-prints*, 2024. 5

[13] Deep Ganguli, Liane Lovitt, Jackson Kernion, Amanda Askell, Yuntao Bai, Saurav Kadavath, Ben Mann, Ethan Perez, Nicholas Schiefer, Kamal Ndousse, et al. Red teaming language models to reduce harms: Methods, scaling behaviors, and lessons learned. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2209.07858*, 2022. 2

[14] Yuwei Guo, Ceyuan Yang, Anyi Rao, Zhengyang Liang, Yaohui Wang, Yu Qiao, Maneesh Agrawala, Dahua Lin, and Bo Dai. Animatediff: Animate your personalized text-to-image diffusion models without specific tuning. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2024. 2

[15] Zhi-Xin Hong, Idan Shenfeld, Tsun-Hsuan Wang, Yung-Sung Chuang, Aparna Pareja, James R Glass, Akash Srivastava, and Pulkit Agrawal. Curiosity-driven red-teaming for large language models. In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2024. 1, 2

[16] Edward J Hu, Yelong Shen, Phillip Wallis, Zeyuan Allen-Zhu, Yuanzhi Li, Shean Wang, Lu Wang, Weizhu Chen, et al. Lora: Low-rank adaptation of large language models. *ICLR*, 1(2):3, 2022. 5

[17] Ziqi Huang, Yinan He, Jiashuo Yu, Fan Zhang, Chenyang Si, Yuming Jiang, Yuanhan Zhang, Tianxing Wu, Qingyang Jin, Nattapol Chanpaisit, et al. Vbench: Comprehensive benchmark suite for video generative models. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition*, pages 21807–21818, 2024. 6

[18] Dan Kondratyuk, Lijun Yu, Xiuye Gu, Jose Lezama, Jonathan Huang, Grant Schindler, Rachel Hornung, Vighnesh Birodkar, Jimmy Yan, Ming-Chang Chiu, et al. Videopoet: A large language model for zero-shot video generation. In *International Conference on Machine Learning*, 2024. 2

[19] Weijie Kong, Qi Tian, Zijian Zhang, Rox Min, Zuozhuo Dai, Jin Zhou, Jiangfeng Xiong, Xin Li, Bo Wu, Jianwei Zhang, et al. Hunyuanvideo: A systematic framework for large video generative models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.03603*, 2024. 1, 2, 5

[20] Boheng Li, Junjie Wang, Yiming Li, Zhiyang Hu, Leyi Qi, Jianshuo Dong, Run Wang, Han Qiu, Zhan Qin, and Tianwei Zhang. DREAM: Scalable red teaming for text-to-image generative systems via distribution modeling. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2507.16329*, 2025. 2

[21] Guanlin Li, Kangjie Chen, Shudong Zhang, Jie Zhang, and Tianwei Zhang. Art: Automatic red-teaming for text-to-image models to protect benign users. In *The Thirty-eighth Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems*, 2024. 1, 2, 5

[22] Yitong Li, Martin Min, Dinghan Shen, David Carlson, and Lawrence Carin. Video generation from text. In *Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, 2018. 2

[23] Jie Liu, Gongye Liu, Jiajun Liang, Ziyang Yuan, Xiaokun Liu, Mingwu Zheng, Xiele Wu, Qiulin Wang, Wenyu Qin, Menghan Xia, et al. Improving video generation with human feedback. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2501.13918*, 2025. 5

[24] Yi Liu, Guowei Yang, Gelei Deng, Feiyue Chen, Yuqi Chen, Ling Shi, Tianwei Zhang, and Yang Liu. Groot: Adversarial testing for generative text-to-image models with tree-based

semantic transformation. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.12100*, 2024. 2

[25] Guoqing Ma, Haoyang Huang, Kun Yan, Liangyu Chen, Nan Duan, Shengming Yin, Changyi Wan, Ranchen Ming, Xiaoniu Song, Xing Chen, et al. Step-video-t2v technical report: The practice, challenges, and future of video foundation model. *arXiv e-prints*, 2025. 2

[26] Ninareh Mehrabi, Palash Goyal, Christophe Dupuy, Qian Hu, Shalini Ghosh, Richard Zemel, Kai-Wei Chang, Aram Galstyan, and Rahul Gupta. Flirt: Feedback loop in-context red teaming. In *Proceedings of the 2024 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*, pages 703–718, 2024. 1, 2, 5

[27] Yibo Miao, Yifan Zhu, Lijia Yu, Jun Zhu, Xiao-Shan Gao, and Yinpeng Dong. T2vsafetybench: Evaluating the safety of text-to-video generative models. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 37:63858–63872, 2024. 1, 2, 5

[28] Long Ouyang, Jeffrey Wu, Xu Jiang, Diogo Almeida, Carroll Wainwright, Pamela Mishkin, Chong Zhang, Sandhini Agarwal, Katarina Slama, Alex Ray, et al. Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback. *Advances in neural information processing systems*, 35:27730–27744, 2022. 5

[29] Yingwei Pan, Zhaofan Qiu, Ting Yao, Houqiang Li, and Tao Mei. To create what you tell: Generating videos from captions. In *Proceedings of the 25th ACM international conference on Multimedia*, pages 1789–1798, 2017. 2

[30] Yan Pang, Aiping Xiong, Yang Zhang, and Tianhao Wang. Towards understanding unsafe video generation. In *NDSS*, 2025. 1, 5

[31] Ethan Perez, Saffron Huang, Francis Song, Trevor Cai, Roman Ring, John Aslanides, Amelia Glaese, Nat McAleese, and Geoffrey Irving. Red teaming language models with language models. In *Proceedings of the 2022 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*, pages 3419–3448, 2022. 2

[32] Adam Polyak, Amit Zohar, Andrew Brown, Andros Tjandra, Animesh Sinha, Ann Lee, Apoorv Vyas, Bowen Shi, Chih-Yao Ma, Ching-Yao Chuang, et al. Movie gen: A cast of media foundation models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.13720*, 2024. 1, 2

[33] Jessica Quaye, Alicia Parrish, Oana Inel, Charvi Rastogi, Hannah Rose Kirk, Minsuk Kahng, Erin Van Liemt, Max Bartolo, Jess Tsang, Justin White, et al. Adversarial nibbler: An open red-teaming method for identifying diverse harms in text-to-image generation. In *Proceedings of the 2024 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency*, pages 388–406, 2024. 2

[34] Mikayel Samvelyan, Sharath Chandra Raparthy, Andrei Lupu, Eric Hambro, Aram H Markosyan, Minqi Bhatt, Yuning Mao, Min Jiang, Jack Parker-Holder, Jakob Foerster, et al. Rainbow teaming: Open-ended generation of diverse adversarial prompts. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.16822*, 2024. 2

[35] Yu Tian, Jian Ren, Menglei Chai, Kyle Olszewski, Xi Peng, Dimitris N Metaxas, and Sergey Tulyakov. A good image generator is what you need for high-resolution video synthesis. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2021. 2

[36] Bertie Vidgen, Tristan Thrush, Zeerak Waseem, and Douwe Kiela. Learning from the worst: Dynamically generated datasets to improve online hate detection. In *ACL*, 2021. 4, 5

[37] Team Wan, Ang Wang, Baole Ai, Bin Wen, Chaojie Mao, Chen-Wei Xie, Di Chen, Feiwu Yu, Haiming Zhao, Jianxiao Yang, et al. Wan: Open and advanced large-scale video generative models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.20314*, 2025. 1, 5

[38] Jiuniu Wang, Hangjie Yuan, Dayou Chen, Yingya Zhang, Xiang Wang, and Shiwei Zhang. Modelscope text-to-video technical report. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.06571*, 2023. 2

[39] Ren-Jian Wang, Ke Xue, Zeyu Qin, Ziniu Li, Sheng Tang, Hao-Tian Li, Shengcai Liu, and Chao Qian. Quality-diversity red-teaming: Automated generation of high-quality and diverse attackers for large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2506.07121*, 2025. 2

[40] Yaohui Wang, Xinyuan Chen, Xin Ma, Shangchen Zhou, Ziqi Huang, Yi Wang, Ceyuan Yang, Yinan He, Jiashuo Yu, Peiqing Yang, et al. Lavie: High-quality video generation with cascaded latent diffusion models. *International Journal of Computer Vision*, 2024. 2

[41] Wei Xu, Kangjie Chen, Jiawei Qiu, Yuyang Zhang, Run Wang, Jin Mao, Tianwei Zhang, and Lina Wang. Automated red teaming for text-to-image models through feedback-guided prompt iteration with vision-language models. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF International Conference on Computer Vision*, 2025. 2

[42] Wilson Yan, Yunzhi Zhang, Pieter Abbeel, and Aravind Srinivas. Videogpt: Video generation using vq-vae and transformers. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2104.10157*, 2021. 2

[43] Yuchen Yang, Bo Hui, Haolin Yuan, Neil Gong, and Yinzhi Cao. Sneakyprompt: Jailbreaking text-to-image generative models. In *2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)*, pages 897–912, 2024. 2

[44] Zhuoyi Yang, Jiayan Teng, Wendi Zheng, Ming Ding, Shiyu Huang, Jiazheng Xu, Yuanming Yang, Wenyi Hong, Xiaohan Zhang, Guanyu Feng, et al. Cogvideox: Text-to-video diffusion models with an expert transformer. In *The Thirteenth International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2025. 1, 2

[45] Jiahao Yu, Xingwei Lin, Zheng Yu, and Xinyu Xing. Gptfuzzer: Red teaming large language models with auto-generated jailbreak prompts. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2309.10253*, 2023. 1

[46] Andrew Zhao, Quentin Xu, Matthieu Lin, Shenzhi Wang, Yong-Jin Liu, Zilong Zheng, and Gao Huang. Diver-ct: Diversity-enhanced red teaming large language model assistants with relaxing constraints. In *Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, pages 26021–26030, 2025. 1

[47] Zangwei Zheng, Xiangyu Peng, Tianji Yang, Chenhui Shen, Shenggui Li, Hongxin Liu, Yukun Zhou, Tianyi Li, and Yang You. Open-sora: Democratizing efficient video production for all. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.20404*, 2024. 1, 2